Optimize cyber control portfolio
Find a budget-, capacity-, availability- and defense-depth-feasible cyber-control portfolio on a nonlinear attack-path graph, recomputing unique-asset expected loss and CVaR under dependencies, exclusions and multiplicative effects.
What it's for
Shows the cyber portfolio leadership should fund after common scenarios, control dependencies, defense in depth, overlapping asset exposure and downside-tail appetite are optimized together.
What you give it
Inputs split into evidence read from your connected systems, calibration your team owns, and numerical controls that affect precision but never the result's meaning.
| Field | Type | Role | Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| beam_width | integer ≥ 1, ≤ 10000 | Numerical control | Optional |
| budget | number ≥ 0 | Your calibration | Yes |
| business_assets | array of objects (3 fields) ≥ 1 item | Evidence | Yes |
| candidate_controls | array of objects (9 fields) | Evidence | Yes |
| capacity_units | number ≥ 0 | Your calibration | Yes |
| control_path_effects | array of objects (5 fields) | Evidence | Yes |
| exact_enumeration_limit | integer ≥ 1, ≤ 1000000 | Your calibration | Optional |
| max_detail_rows | integer ≥ 1, ≤ 500 | Numerical control | Optional |
| maximum_control_unavailability_probability | number ≥ 0, ≤ 1 | Your calibration | Optional |
| maximum_cvar_total_loss | any | Your calibration | Optional |
| maximum_expected_total_loss | any | Your calibration | Optional |
| maximum_uncontrolled_critical_path_fraction | number ≥ 0, ≤ 1 | Your calibration | Optional |
| minimum_distinct_control_stages_per_critical_path | integer ≥ 1, ≤ 4 | Your calibration | Optional |
| risk_aversion | number ≥ 0 | Your calibration | Optional |
| scenarios | array of objects (3 fields) ≥ 2 items | Evidence | Yes |
| tail_probability | number ≥ 0.001, ≤ 0.5 | Your calibration | Optional |
| threat_paths | array of objects (7 fields) | Evidence | Yes |
Each candidate_controls
record
| Field | Type | Required |
|---|---|---|
| available_scenario_ids | array of string | Yes |
| capacity_units | number (≥ 0) | Yes |
| control_stage | one of "prevent", "detect", "respond", "recover" | Yes |
| dependency_control_ids | array of string | Yes |
| evidence_verified | boolean | Yes |
| exclusion_control_ids | array of string | Yes |
| id | string (non-empty) | Yes |
| operating_cost_scenarios | array of number (≥ 2 items) | Yes |
| upfront_cost | number (≥ 0) | Yes |
{
"budget": 10,
"business_assets": [
{
"evidence_verified": true,
"id": "payments",
"value_at_risk": 100
}
],
"candidate_controls": [
{
"available_scenario_ids": [
"base",
"campaign"
],
"capacity_units": 1,
"control_stage": "prevent",
"dependency_control_ids": [],
"evidence_verified": true,
"exclusion_control_ids": [],
"id": "prevent-control",
"operating_cost_scenarios": [
0,
0
],
"upfront_cost": 5
},
{
"available_scenario_ids": [
"base",
"campaign"
],
"capacity_units": 1,
"control_stage": "detect",
"dependency_control_ids": [],
"evidence_verified": true,
"exclusion_control_ids": [],
"id": "detect-control",
"operating_cost_scenarios": [
0,
0
],
"upfront_cost": 5
}, Truncated for display — the full payload is 170 lines.
What you get back
This is the actual output of running the example above — computed by the same function the platform calls, not an illustration.
{
"assumptions": [
"Business assets are unique value sources; threat paths are versioned aggregate models; scenario path probabilities, direct losses, control effects, availability and costs share one horizon and preserve common-cause futures.",
"Selected control effects multiply residual path probability and unique asset loss unions overlapping paths, preventing additive control credit and repeated asset value. Upfront, operating, direct response and business loss are non-overlapping.",
"Defense-in-depth requires distinct prevent/detect/respond/recover stages on critical paths, not several controls with the same label. Dependencies, exclusions and scenario availability represent tested feasibility, not nominal product features.",
"Exact mode certifies only the supplied finite model; beam output is heuristic. Neither establishes causal effectiveness, compliance, legal privilege, breach absence or authority to investigate, disclose, surveil, procure, block or change production."
],
"constraints": {
"budget": 10,
"capacity_units": 2,
"maximum_control_unavailability_probability": 0,
"maximum_cvar_total_loss": null,
"maximum_expected_total_loss": null,
"maximum_uncontrolled_critical_path_fraction": 0,
"minimum_distinct_control_stages_per_critical_path": 2,
"risk_aversion": 0,
"tail_probability": 0.1
},
"control_pareto_frontier": [
{
"cvar_total_cost_and_loss": 102.56,
"defense_in_depth_feasible": false,
"expected_total_cost_and_loss": 71.508,
"risk_feasible": false,
"selected_control_ids": [],
"upfront_cost": 0
},
{
"cvar_total_cost_and_loss": 29.1984,
"defense_in_depth_feasible": false,
"expected_total_cost_and_loss": 21.2139,
"risk_feasible": false,
"selected_control_ids": [
"prevent-control"
],
"upfront_cost": 5
},
{
"cvar_total_cost_and_loss": 29.1984,
"defense_in_depth_feasible": false,
"expected_total_cost_and_loss": 21.2139,
"risk_feasible": false,
"selected_control_ids": [
"detect-control" Truncated for display — the full payload is 134 lines.
How it works
Network & dependency analysis — Trace how load, failure and knowledge propagate through a graph of teams, services or components.
- 1 Freeze unique assets, coherent scenario path probabilities/direct losses, executable controls, stage labels, full costs, availability, relations and prospectively tested path effects.
- 2 Enumerate dependency-closed subsets when tractable or disclose deterministic beam search; reject relation, budget, capacity, availability, defense-depth, expected-loss and CVaR infeasibility.
- 3 For every candidate multiply residual path probabilities, union overlapping losses per unique asset, add direct and operating loss, then expose the risk/resource Pareto frontier and certificate boundary.
Before you trust it
Every tool in the catalog ships with the conditions under which its answer is meaningful — and the conditions under which it should abstain instead of guessing.
Assumptions & guardrails
- Nodes, edges, direction, time window, missing-link policy, and aggregation boundary represent the coordination or dependency mechanism of interest.
- Candidate effects compose multiplicatively, scenario vectors share one order and horizon, costs and loss sources are non-overlapping, and control stage plus availability reflect tested operation rather than nominal features.
- Structural centrality, fragility, or clustering describes a modeled graph and must not be interpreted as intent, guilt, or personal value.
- Exact mode certifies only the submitted finite model and beam mode is heuristic; output is not a compliance finding, causal guarantee, procurement instruction or authority to investigate, surveil, disclose, block or change production.
Minimum evidence
- business_assets: at least 1 rows/items
- threat_paths: required and organization-defined
- scenarios: at least 2 rows/items
- candidate_controls: required and organization-defined
- control_path_effects: required and organization-defined
- budget: required and organization-defined
- capacity_units: required and organization-defined
How to validate it
Validate on held-out periods or aggregate units, perturb edge definitions and missing links, and report sensitivity to graph construction before using structural rankings.
Calibrating it to your org
Same for everyone
The mathematical kernel, validation rules, method version, and JSON output semantics are organization-independent; no tenant-trained coefficients or company benchmark is embedded in the function.
Specific to you
- one immutable optimization projection joining the same asset/path/scenario version to a governed candidate-control registry, preserving dependency closure, effect composition, delivery feasibility, common-mode futures and unique asset identity
- candidate executability, causal effect evidence and composition, value/cost/currency/horizon perimeter, scenario probability and dependence, availability, dependencies/exclusions, delivery capacity, defense-depth, expected/CVaR appetite, solver boundary, pseudonymization and security/risk/finance/architecture approval
Calibration workflow
- 1 Define the management decision, target outcome, aggregate unit, privacy boundary, cadence, and prediction/intervention horizon for this organization.
- 2 Build a tenant-scoped historical cohort using only information available before each prediction or decision; preserve zero periods, censoring, assignment probabilities, and unresolved outcomes when the method requires them.
- 3 Estimate statistical parameters on training history, but obtain costs, utilities, risk tolerance, practical-effect thresholds, capacity, and policy constraints from accountable decision owners.
- 4 Validate on later time windows or held-out aggregate units at the deployment grain, against a simple baseline and the function-specific validation strategy.
- 5 Deploy only if the returned decision clears evidence, overlap, calibration, robustness, and guardrail checks; warning, unsupported, schema-gap, and fallback decisions are abstentions.
- 6 Monitor realized outcomes, data drift, coverage, and decision regret; recalibrate at a governed cadence or after a detected regime/definition change, never merely because a stakeholder dislikes the result.
Call it from your AI
You don't wire up 388 tools in your MCP client. The GitRevio MCP server exposes 18 tools, three of which let an agent search the catalog, read a tool's schema, and run it — so the assistant finds this one on its own.
gitrevio_capabilities_search
{ "q": "find a budget capacity availability and" }
→ finds "optimize_cyber_control_portfolio"
gitrevio_capability_describe
{ "capability_id": "optimize_cyber_control_portfolio" }
→ returns the input schema and agent guidance shown on this page
gitrevio_capability_run
{ "capability_id": "optimize_cyber_control_portfolio", "arguments": { ... } }
→ returns the result shown above Works in Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, Cline, Continue.dev, Goose and Aider. See the MCP server.
Related tools
Audit cyber control evidence integrity
Audit whether claimed defense in depth is supported by current independent control tests mapped to declared attack-path steps, while preserving duplicate mappings and counting each exposed business asset only once.
Forecast cyber control failure loss
Forecast expected and tail cyber loss with locally pooled threat frequency, control reliability and lognormal loss severity, drawing one shared control state across every path it protects to preserve common-mode failure.
Audit data sovereignty residency evidence integrity
Audit every governed data asset's point-in-time storage, processing, replica, backup, log/cache and key locations plus cross-region transfers against an effective counsel-supplied residency policy, independent evidence, encryption controls and retention limits.
Audit software supply chain integrity
Audit the deployed runtime software supply chain from application roots through resolved dependency edges: reconcile SBOM freshness, version resolution, source pinning, artifact attestation, support horizon, license policy, vulnerability disposition, evidence coverage and unique application value without treating repository text as provenance or exploitability evidence.
Audit workforce identity access evidence integrity
Audit the point-in-time chain from an opaque workforce subject through authorized accounts, independent identity evidence, approved least-privilege grants and MFA/device-backed access events.
Bayesian account risk triage
Prioritize human review of auditable account-security and policy-conflict evidence using Bayes factors and decision costs.