Audit software supply chain integrity
Audit the deployed runtime software supply chain from application roots through resolved dependency edges: reconcile SBOM freshness, version resolution, source pinning, artifact attestation, support horizon, license policy, vulnerability disposition, evidence coverage and unique application value without treating repository text as provenance or exploitability evidence.
What it's for
Reconciles what is actually deployed against SBOM freshness, pinning, attestation, support horizon and license policy — without treating a repository's README as provenance.
Turns SBOM coverage into an executive-grade integrity control that reveals exactly which unique business applications depend on stale, unattested, unsupported, license-restricted or unresolved runtime components.
What you give it
Inputs split into evidence read from your connected systems, calibration your team owns, and numerical controls that affect precision but never the result's meaning.
| Field | Type | Role | Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| applications | array of objects (4 fields) ≥ 1 item | Evidence | Yes |
| as_of_period | integer ≥ 0 | Your calibration | Yes |
| components | array of objects (10 fields) ≥ 1 item | Evidence | Yes |
| dependency_edges | array of objects (5 fields) | Evidence | Yes |
| max_detail_rows | integer ≥ 1, ≤ 500 | Numerical control | Optional |
| maximum_sbom_age_periods | integer ≥ 0, ≤ 10000 | Your calibration | Optional |
| maximum_unattested_reachable_fraction | number ≥ 0, ≤ 1 | Your calibration | Optional |
| maximum_unresolved_reachable_fraction | number ≥ 0, ≤ 1 | Your calibration | Optional |
| minimum_evidence_coverage | number ≥ 0, ≤ 1 | Your calibration | Optional |
| vulnerability_findings | array of objects (6 fields) | Evidence | Yes |
Each components
record
| Field | Type | Required |
|---|---|---|
| artifact_attested | boolean | Yes |
| evidence_verified | boolean | Yes |
| id | string (non-empty) | Yes |
| license_status | one of "approved", "restricted", "unknown" | Yes |
| resolved | boolean | Yes |
| risk_class | string (non-empty) | Yes |
| sbom_as_of_period | integer (≥ 0) | Yes |
| source_pinned | boolean | Yes |
| support_end_period | integer (≥ 0) | Yes |
| version | string | Yes |
{
"applications": [
{
"evidence_verified": true,
"id": "checkout",
"root_component_ids": [
"checkout-service"
],
"value_at_risk": 200
}
],
"as_of_period": 12,
"components": [
{
"artifact_attested": true,
"evidence_verified": true,
"id": "checkout-service",
"license_status": "approved",
"resolved": true,
"risk_class": "internal",
"sbom_as_of_period": 12,
"source_pinned": true,
"support_end_period": 24,
"version": "1.0.0"
},
{
"artifact_attested": true,
"evidence_verified": true,
"id": "parser",
"license_status": "approved",
"resolved": true,
"risk_class": "third-party-runtime",
"sbom_as_of_period": 12,
"source_pinned": true,
"support_end_period": 24,
"version": "3.2.1"
}
],
"dependency_edges": [
{
"child_component_id": "parser",
"evidence_verified": true,
"id": "checkout-parser",
"parent_component_id": "checkout-service", Truncated for display — the full payload is 49 lines.
What you get back
This is the actual output of running the example above — computed by the same function the platform calls, not an illustration.
{
"application_diagnostics": [
{
"application_id": "checkout",
"integrity_gap_component_count": 0,
"integrity_gap_component_ids": [],
"reachable_component_count": 2,
"value_at_risk": 200,
"value_exposed_to_integrity_gap": false
}
],
"assumptions": [
"The graph is a point-in-time runtime SBOM resolved to deployed artifacts. Build/test-only edges are retained as evidence but do not create runtime application exposure; every application value is a unique finance-governed source counted at most once.",
"Attestation, pinning, license, support and vulnerability states come from authoritative scanners, artifact registries, legal/procurement and security review. Repository text, package popularity, maintainer identity or an LLM guess is not provenance or exploitability evidence.",
"A failed gate identifies supply-chain evidence or policy work. It does not prove compromise, malicious intent, maintainer or developer fault, legal infringement, or a loss amount and does not authorize blocking, investigation, disclosure, employment or vendor action."
],
"component_diagnostics": [
{
"component_id": "checkout-service",
"fix_available_finding_count": 0,
"gap_types": [],
"license_status": "approved",
"open_or_accepted_finding_count": 0,
"reachable_application_count": 1,
"sbom_as_of_period": 12,
"support_end_period": 24,
"version": "1.0.0"
},
{
"component_id": "parser",
"fix_available_finding_count": 0,
"gap_types": [],
"license_status": "approved",
"open_or_accepted_finding_count": 0,
"reachable_application_count": 1,
"sbom_as_of_period": 12,
"support_end_period": 24,
"version": "3.2.1"
}
],
"configuration": {
"application_value_rule": "count_each_application_value_once",
"as_of_period": 12,
"dependency_scope": "runtime_reachable_edges_only", Truncated for display — the full payload is 70 lines.
How it works
Constrained optimization — Pick the best feasible option under real limits — budget, headcount, dependencies, capacity — rather than ranking a list and hoping it fits.
- 1 Freeze application roots, deployed component versions, runtime dependency edges, vulnerability dispositions and authoritative provenance/license/support evidence at one as-of period.
- 2 Traverse each application graph, retain cycles and duplicate pairs as integrity findings, and separate reachable deployed components from orphan inventory rather than counting every manifest row as exposure.
- 3 Gate value once per unique application on resolution, pinning, attestation, freshness, support, license, exploitability and evidence coverage; return exact component/application diagnostics for reconciliation.
Before you trust it
Every tool in the catalog ships with the conditions under which its answer is meaningful — and the conditions under which it should abstain instead of guessing.
Assumptions & guardrails
- Objectives use commensurable locally governed value units, constraints reflect real feasibility, and uncertainty covers plausible adverse inputs.
- The SBOM resolves deployed artifacts, runtime reachability is evidence-backed, application value sources are unique, and scanner, registry, legal, support and security states share one point-in-time perimeter.
- The recommendation is optimal only for its stated objective, feasible set, evidence, and solver guarantee; it is not a universal management optimum.
- An integrity gap is not proof of compromise, malicious intent, legal infringement, maintainer/developer fault or loss, and never authorizes blocking, investigation, disclosure, employment or vendor action.
Minimum evidence
- applications: at least 1 rows/items
- components: at least 1 rows/items
- dependency_edges: required and organization-defined
- vulnerability_findings: required and organization-defined
- as_of_period: required and organization-defined
How to validate it
Backtest the chosen action against simple feasible baselines on held-out scenarios, sweep costs/constraints/risk tolerance, and require constraint feasibility under adverse inputs.
Calibrating it to your org
Same for everyone
The mathematical kernel, validation rules, method version, and JSON output semantics are organization-independent; no tenant-trained coefficients or company benchmark is embedded in the function.
Specific to you
- point-in-time deployed runtime SBOM graph joined to artifact registry attestations, vulnerability management, support lifecycle, legal license policy and unique application-value registry without treating every manifest or scanner row as deployed exposure
- application/component identity and deployment perimeter, runtime/build scope, SBOM cadence, version resolution and pinning rules, attestation authority, support and license policy, finding/disposition taxonomy, unique value perimeter, evidence thresholds, retention, pseudonymization and accountable platform/security/legal/finance owners
Calibration workflow
- 1 Define the management decision, target outcome, aggregate unit, privacy boundary, cadence, and prediction/intervention horizon for this organization.
- 2 Build a tenant-scoped historical cohort using only information available before each prediction or decision; preserve zero periods, censoring, assignment probabilities, and unresolved outcomes when the method requires them.
- 3 Estimate statistical parameters on training history, but obtain costs, utilities, risk tolerance, practical-effect thresholds, capacity, and policy constraints from accountable decision owners.
- 4 Validate on later time windows or held-out aggregate units at the deployment grain, against a simple baseline and the function-specific validation strategy.
- 5 Deploy only if the returned decision clears evidence, overlap, calibration, robustness, and guardrail checks; warning, unsupported, schema-gap, and fallback decisions are abstentions.
- 6 Monitor realized outcomes, data drift, coverage, and decision regret; recalibrate at a governed cadence or after a detected regime/definition change, never merely because a stakeholder dislikes the result.
Call it from your AI
You don't wire up 388 tools in your MCP client. The GitRevio MCP server exposes 18 tools, three of which let an agent search the catalog, read a tool's schema, and run it — so the assistant finds this one on its own.
gitrevio_capabilities_search
{ "q": "audit the deployed runtime software supply" }
→ finds "audit_software_supply_chain_integrity"
gitrevio_capability_describe
{ "capability_id": "audit_software_supply_chain_integrity" }
→ returns the input schema and agent guidance shown on this page
gitrevio_capability_run
{ "capability_id": "audit_software_supply_chain_integrity", "arguments": { ... } }
→ returns the result shown above Works in Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, Cline, Continue.dev, Goose and Aider. See the MCP server.
Related tools
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