Forecast cyber control failure loss
Forecast expected and tail cyber loss with locally pooled threat frequency, control reliability and lognormal loss severity, drawing one shared control state across every path it protects to preserve common-mode failure.
What it's for
Gives CTOs and investors a locally calibrated cyber loss range that exposes common-mode control failure and avoids double-counting the same business asset across attack paths.
What you give it
Inputs split into evidence read from your connected systems, calibration your team owns, and numerical controls that affect precision but never the result's meaning.
| Field | Type | Role | Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| business_assets | array of objects (3 fields) ≥ 1 item | Evidence | Yes |
| control_path_effects | array of objects (5 fields) | Evidence | Yes |
| control_prior_failures | number > 0 | Your calibration | Optional |
| control_prior_successes | number > 0 | Your calibration | Optional |
| controls | array of objects (3 fields) | Evidence | Yes |
| historical_control_tests | array of objects (4 fields) | Evidence | Yes |
| historical_loss_events | array of objects (4 fields) | Evidence | Yes |
| historical_threat_periods | array of objects (5 fields) | Evidence | Yes |
| horizon_periods | integer ≥ 1, ≤ 120 | Your calibration | Optional |
| max_detail_rows | integer ≥ 1, ≤ 500 | Numerical control | Optional |
| minimum_control_tests | integer ≥ 1 | Your calibration | Optional |
| minimum_loss_events | integer ≥ 1 | Your calibration | Optional |
| minimum_threat_periods | integer ≥ 1 | Your calibration | Optional |
| scenarios | array of objects (7 fields) | Evidence | Yes |
| seed | integer ≥ 0 | Numerical control | Optional |
| severity_prior_strength | number > 0 | Your calibration | Optional |
| simulations | integer ≥ 100, ≤ 100000 | Numerical control | Optional |
| tail_probability | number ≥ 0.001, ≤ 0.5 | Your calibration | Optional |
| threat_paths | array of objects (6 fields) | Evidence | Yes |
| threat_prior_exposure_units | number > 0 | Your calibration | Optional |
Each scenarios
record
| Field | Type | Required |
|---|---|---|
| asset_loss_multiplier | number (≥ 0) | Yes |
| control_failure_multiplier | number (≥ 0) | Yes |
| evidence_verified | boolean | Yes |
| id | string (non-empty) | Yes |
| loss_severity_multiplier | number (≥ 0) | Yes |
| probability | number (≥ 0, ≤ 1) | Yes |
| threat_frequency_multiplier | number (≥ 0) | Yes |
{
"business_assets": [
{
"evidence_verified": true,
"id": "payments",
"value_at_risk": 100
}
],
"control_path_effects": [
{
"control_id": "access",
"effectiveness_if_working": 0.7,
"evidence_verified": true,
"id": "access-credential",
"path_id": "credential-path"
},
{
"control_id": "detection",
"effectiveness_if_working": 0.5,
"evidence_verified": true,
"id": "detection-credential",
"path_id": "credential-path"
},
{
"control_id": "detection",
"effectiveness_if_working": 0.5,
"evidence_verified": true,
"id": "detection-session",
"path_id": "session-path"
}
],
"controls": [
{
"control_class": "preventive",
"evidence_verified": true,
"id": "access"
},
{
"control_class": "detective",
"evidence_verified": true,
"id": "detection"
}
],
"historical_control_tests": [ Truncated for display — the full payload is 264 lines.
What you get back
This is the actual output of running the example above — computed by the same function the platform calls, not an illustration.
{
"asset_diagnostics": [
{
"asset_id": "payments",
"expected_business_loss": 4.22,
"simulated_loss_probability": 0.055,
"value_at_risk": 100
}
],
"assumptions": [
"Threat exposure periods include zero-attempt periods, control tests are prospectively defined and independently recorded, and direct loss marks are finance reconciled. Selective testing, right truncation or post-outcome class changes invalidate calibration.",
"Each control draws one state per simulation that is shared across all paths it protects, preserving common-mode failure. Threat frequency, control failure, direct severity and business loss move together only through the submitted scenarios.",
"Multiple paths reaching the same business asset combine multiplicatively and cannot lose more than its unique governed value. Direct response loss remains separate and additive across simulated successful paths.",
"This is aggregate conditional decision support, not a breach forecast, attacker attribution, compliance or insurance opinion, vulnerability disclosure, or authority to investigate, notify, surveil, block or change production."
],
"configuration": {
"asset_loss_rule": "multiplicative_union_per_unique_asset",
"control_prior_failures": 2,
"control_prior_successes": 2,
"control_state_model": "beta_binomial_shared_state_across_paths",
"direct_loss_model": "partially_pooled_lognormal_marks",
"minimum_control_tests": 5,
"minimum_loss_events": 2,
"minimum_threat_periods": 10,
"seed": 19,
"severity_prior_strength": 5,
"tail_probability": 0.1,
"threat_frequency_model": "empirical_bayes_gamma_poisson",
"threat_prior_exposure_units": 20
},
"control_class_diagnostics": [
{
"control_class": "detective",
"historical_test_count": 6,
"historical_test_pass_fraction": 0.6667,
"posterior_working_probability": 0.6,
"support_sufficient": true
},
{
"control_class": "preventive",
"historical_test_count": 6,
"historical_test_pass_fraction": 0.8333,
"posterior_working_probability": 0.7,
"support_sufficient": true Truncated for display — the full payload is 106 lines.
How it works
Forecasting & survival — Estimate when something completes or fails, with censoring and unresolved work handled honestly rather than dropped.
- 1 Fit empirical-Bayes Gamma-Poisson threat rates from exposure periods including zeros, Beta-Binomial working probabilities from independent control tests, and partially pooled lognormal direct-loss marks.
- 2 Simulate coherent management scenarios, drawing one working state per control and simulation so a common control failure propagates across every protected path.
- 3 Union overlapping path loss multiplicatively within each unique asset, add separately defined direct response loss, and return expected loss, VaR/CVaR and support diagnostics only when local evidence gates pass.
Before you trust it
Every tool in the catalog ships with the conditions under which its answer is meaningful — and the conditions under which it should abstain instead of guessing.
Assumptions & guardrails
- Training examples precede their outcomes, censoring and unresolved work are represented, and deployment populations remain comparable to validation cohorts.
- Threat exposure, control tests and loss marks are complete at the declared class grain; scenarios share one horizon; path effects are prospective; direct and asset loss definitions do not overlap.
- A predictive interval or risk estimate is not a deadline promise, causal explanation, or individual-performance judgment.
- This is an aggregate conditional loss distribution, not a breach prediction, attacker attribution, legal/compliance/insurance opinion or authority to investigate, surveil, notify, block or change production.
Minimum evidence
- historical_threat_periods: required and organization-defined
- historical_control_tests: required and organization-defined
- historical_loss_events: required and organization-defined
- business_assets: at least 1 rows/items
- threat_paths: required and organization-defined
- controls: required and organization-defined
- control_path_effects: required and organization-defined
- scenarios: required and organization-defined
How to validate it
Use chronological train/calibration/test windows, compare proper scores and decision value with a simple baseline, and recalibrate only from outcomes resolved after prediction time.
Calibrating it to your org
Same for everyone
The mathematical kernel, validation rules, method version, and JSON output semantics are organization-independent; no tenant-trained coefficients or company benchmark is embedded in the function.
Specific to you
- immutable tenant-local exposure/test/loss cohorts joined to one versioned threat/control graph and common scenario set, preserving zero periods, failed tests, class definitions, shared control identity and unique asset identity
- threat/control class stability, exposure unit and horizon, selection/censoring rules, direct-versus-asset loss perimeter, control test independence, prospective effect evidence, scenario dependence, prior strength, local support gates, tail probability, value/currency and accountable security/risk/finance owners
Calibration workflow
- 1 Define the management decision, target outcome, aggregate unit, privacy boundary, cadence, and prediction/intervention horizon for this organization.
- 2 Build a tenant-scoped historical cohort using only information available before each prediction or decision; preserve zero periods, censoring, assignment probabilities, and unresolved outcomes when the method requires them.
- 3 Estimate statistical parameters on training history, but obtain costs, utilities, risk tolerance, practical-effect thresholds, capacity, and policy constraints from accountable decision owners.
- 4 Validate on later time windows or held-out aggregate units at the deployment grain, against a simple baseline and the function-specific validation strategy.
- 5 Deploy only if the returned decision clears evidence, overlap, calibration, robustness, and guardrail checks; warning, unsupported, schema-gap, and fallback decisions are abstentions.
- 6 Monitor realized outcomes, data drift, coverage, and decision regret; recalibrate at a governed cadence or after a detected regime/definition change, never merely because a stakeholder dislikes the result.
Call it from your AI
You don't wire up 388 tools in your MCP client. The GitRevio MCP server exposes 18 tools, three of which let an agent search the catalog, read a tool's schema, and run it — so the assistant finds this one on its own.
gitrevio_capabilities_search
{ "q": "forecast expected and tail cyber loss" }
→ finds "forecast_cyber_control_failure_loss"
gitrevio_capability_describe
{ "capability_id": "forecast_cyber_control_failure_loss" }
→ returns the input schema and agent guidance shown on this page
gitrevio_capability_run
{ "capability_id": "forecast_cyber_control_failure_loss", "arguments": { ... } }
→ returns the result shown above Works in Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, Cline, Continue.dev, Goose and Aider. See the MCP server.
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