Audit data sovereignty residency evidence integrity
Audit every governed data asset's point-in-time storage, processing, replica, backup, log/cache and key locations plus cross-region transfers against an effective counsel-supplied residency policy, independent evidence, encryption controls and retention limits.
What it's for
Turns Gitrevio's EU residency, BYOK and in-region backup promise into a customer-verifiable evidence control spanning every storage and processing surface.
What you give it
Inputs split into evidence read from your connected systems, calibration your team owns, and numerical controls that affect precision but never the result's meaning.
| Field | Type | Role | Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| as_of_ms | number ≥ 0 | Your calibration | Yes |
| data_assets | array of objects (6 fields) | Evidence | Yes |
| data_locations | array of objects (14 fields) ≥ 0 items | Evidence | Yes |
| data_transfers | array of objects (8 fields) ≥ 0 items | Evidence | Yes |
| max_detail_rows | integer ≥ 1, ≤ 500 | Numerical control | Optional |
| maximum_observation_age_days | number ≥ 0 | Your calibration | Optional |
| minimum_independent_location_observations | integer ≥ 1, ≤ 100 | Your calibration | Optional |
| minimum_verified_asset_fraction | number ≥ 0, ≤ 1 | Your calibration | Optional |
| residency_policies | array of objects (13 fields) | Evidence | Yes |
Each data_locations
record
| Field | Type | Required |
|---|---|---|
| artifact_hash | string (non-empty) | Yes |
| asset_id | string (non-empty) | Yes |
| evidence_verified | boolean | Yes |
| id | string (non-empty) | Yes |
| independently_verified | boolean | Yes |
| location_type | one of "storage", "replica", "processing", "cache", "log", "backup", "key" | Yes |
| observed_at_ms | number (≥ 0) | Yes |
| provider_id | string (non-empty) | Yes |
| region_id | string (non-empty) | Yes |
| retention_until_ms | number (≥ 0) | Yes |
| satisfied_control_ids | array of string | Yes |
| source_system_id | string (non-empty) | Yes |
| valid_from_ms | number (≥ 0) | Yes |
| valid_until_ms | number,null (≥ 0) | Yes |
{
"as_of_ms": 2000,
"data_assets": [
{
"created_at_ms": 0,
"data_class_id": "customer-code",
"deleted_at_ms": null,
"evidence_verified": true,
"id": "asset-1",
"required_location_type_ids": [
"storage",
"processing",
"backup",
"key"
]
}
],
"data_locations": [
{
"artifact_hash": "hash-storage",
"asset_id": "asset-1",
"evidence_verified": true,
"id": "location-storage",
"independently_verified": true,
"location_type": "storage",
"observed_at_ms": 1000,
"provider_id": "provider-a",
"region_id": "eu-west",
"retention_until_ms": 31536000000,
"satisfied_control_ids": [
"tenant-kms"
],
"source_system_id": "source-storage",
"valid_from_ms": 0,
"valid_until_ms": null
},
{
"artifact_hash": "hash-processing",
"asset_id": "asset-1",
"evidence_verified": true,
"id": "location-processing",
"independently_verified": true,
"location_type": "processing",
"observed_at_ms": 1000, Truncated for display — the full payload is 131 lines.
What you get back
This is the actual output of running the example above — computed by the same function the platform calls, not an illustration.
{
"asset_diagnostics": [
{
"asset_id": "asset-1",
"data_class_id": "customer-code",
"disallowed_location_ids": [],
"failed_gates": [],
"missing_location_type_ids": [],
"passed": true,
"policy_id": "eu-v1",
"retention_failure_location_ids": [],
"stale_location_ids": [],
"transfer_failure_ids": []
}
],
"configuration": {
"as_of_ms": 2000,
"maximum_observation_age_days": 2,
"minimum_independent_location_observations": 1,
"minimum_verified_asset_fraction": 0.95
},
"decision": "pass",
"failed_gates": {
"asset_failure_counts": {},
"orphan_location_ids": [],
"orphan_transfer_ids": [],
"overlapping_active_policy_class_ids": []
},
"guardrails": [
"Policy allowlists, transfer mechanisms and retention limits are governed inputs; this function does not infer law or provide legal advice.",
"Passing means the submitted point-in-time evidence is internally consistent, not that every undiscovered copy or future transfer is compliant.",
"The function never moves, deletes, re-encrypts, reroutes or exposes customer data."
],
"method": "point_in_time_data_sovereignty_evidence_audit_v1",
"summary": {
"active_policy_class_count": 1,
"asset_count": 1,
"location_observation_count": 4,
"policy_class_count": 1,
"transfer_observation_count": 1,
"verified_asset_count": 1,
"verified_asset_fraction": 1
}
} How it works
Constrained optimization — Pick the best feasible option under real limits — budget, headcount, dependencies, capacity — rather than ranking a list and hoping it fits.
- 1 Freeze one effective residency policy per governed data class at the as-of time; policies—not the algorithm—supply permissible storage, processing, backup and key regions, required controls, transfer-mechanism and retention rules.
- 2 Reconcile the complete asset perimeter to active infrastructure, database, object-store, backup, logging, cache, processing and KMS observations using distinct source/artifact evidence and explicit validity intervals.
- 3 Test required location-type completeness, allowed regions, encryption controls, retention, current independent evidence and evidenced cross-region mechanisms; surface orphans and policy overlap as repair gates.
Before you trust it
Every tool in the catalog ships with the conditions under which its answer is meaningful — and the conditions under which it should abstain instead of guessing.
Assumptions & guardrails
- Objectives use commensurable locally governed value units, constraints reflect real feasibility, and uncertainty covers plausible adverse inputs.
- Asset discovery covers every tenant copy and derivative; observations are immutable, tenant-scoped, independently sourced and timestamped before the audit cutoff.
- The recommendation is optimal only for its stated objective, feasible set, evidence, and solver guarantee; it is not a universal management optimum.
- Passing establishes internal consistency of submitted point-in-time evidence, not legal advice, discovery of every hidden copy, or guaranteed future compliance.
Minimum evidence
- residency_policies: required and organization-defined
- data_assets: required and organization-defined
- data_locations: at least 0 rows/items
- data_transfers: at least 0 rows/items
- as_of_ms: required and organization-defined
How to validate it
Backtest the chosen action against simple feasible baselines on held-out scenarios, sweep costs/constraints/risk tolerance, and require constraint feasibility under adverse inputs.
Calibrating it to your org
Same for everyone
The mathematical kernel, validation rules, method version, and JSON output semantics are organization-independent; no tenant-trained coefficients or company benchmark is embedded in the function.
Specific to you
- tenant-scoped point-in-time asset/location/transfer perimeter joined to exactly one effective policy version without future evidence, expired observations or undiscovered infrastructure surfaces
- data-class boundary, storage/processing/backup/key allowlists, transfer-mechanism rule, retention horizon, required encryption controls, evidence independence/freshness and verified-asset coverage
Calibration workflow
- 1 Define the management decision, target outcome, aggregate unit, privacy boundary, cadence, and prediction/intervention horizon for this organization.
- 2 Build a tenant-scoped historical cohort using only information available before each prediction or decision; preserve zero periods, censoring, assignment probabilities, and unresolved outcomes when the method requires them.
- 3 Estimate statistical parameters on training history, but obtain costs, utilities, risk tolerance, practical-effect thresholds, capacity, and policy constraints from accountable decision owners.
- 4 Validate on later time windows or held-out aggregate units at the deployment grain, against a simple baseline and the function-specific validation strategy.
- 5 Deploy only if the returned decision clears evidence, overlap, calibration, robustness, and guardrail checks; warning, unsupported, schema-gap, and fallback decisions are abstentions.
- 6 Monitor realized outcomes, data drift, coverage, and decision regret; recalibrate at a governed cadence or after a detected regime/definition change, never merely because a stakeholder dislikes the result.
Call it from your AI
You don't wire up 388 tools in your MCP client. The GitRevio MCP server exposes 18 tools, three of which let an agent search the catalog, read a tool's schema, and run it — so the assistant finds this one on its own.
gitrevio_capabilities_search
{ "q": "audit every governed data assets pointintime" }
→ finds "audit_data_sovereignty_residency_evidence_integrity"
gitrevio_capability_describe
{ "capability_id": "audit_data_sovereignty_residency_evidence_integrity" }
→ returns the input schema and agent guidance shown on this page
gitrevio_capability_run
{ "capability_id": "audit_data_sovereignty_residency_evidence_integrity", "arguments": { ... } }
→ returns the result shown above Works in Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, Cline, Continue.dev, Goose and Aider. See the MCP server.
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