Optimize shadow AI governance portfolio
Choose block, broker, migrate, allow-with-controls or monitor policy for each aggregate shadow-AI service class, maximizing expected value minus loss CVaR under residual-exposure, detection, control, dependency, exclusion, budget and resource gates while pricing common provider value at risk once through joint survival.
What it's for
Answers what IT should do after finding shadow AI: what to block, broker, migrate, govern or monitor to reduce correlated exposure without needlessly destroying legitimate business value.
What you give it
Inputs split into evidence read from your connected systems, calibration your team owns, and numerical controls that affect precision but never the result's meaning.
| Field | Type | Role | Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| beam_width | integer ≥ 1, ≤ 100000 | Numerical control | Optional |
| exact_state_limit | integer ≥ 1, ≤ 10000000 | Your calibration | Optional |
| governance_options | array of objects (16 fields) | Evidence | Yes |
| implementation_budget | number ≥ 0 | Your calibration | Yes |
| max_detail_rows | integer ≥ 1, ≤ 500 | Numerical control | Optional |
| provider_groups | array of objects (2 fields) | Evidence | Yes |
| resource_capacities | array of objects (2 fields) | Evidence | Yes |
| risk_aversion | number ≥ 0 | Your calibration | Optional |
| scenarios | array of objects (4 fields) | Evidence | Yes |
| service_classes | array of objects (8 fields) | Evidence | Yes |
| tail_probability | number > 0, < 1 | Your calibration | Optional |
Each governance_options
record
| Field | Type | Required |
|---|---|---|
| dependency_option_ids | array of string | Yes |
| detection_coverage_scenarios | array of number | Yes |
| direct_loss_multiplier_scenarios | array of number | Yes |
| evidence_verified | boolean | Yes |
| exclusion_option_ids | array of string | Yes |
| exposure_reduction_fraction | number (≥ 0, ≤ 1) | Yes |
| id | string (non-empty) | Yes |
| implementation_cost | number (≥ 0) | Yes |
| incident_probability_scenarios | array of number | Yes |
| is_current_state | boolean | Yes |
| operating_cost_scenarios | array of number | Yes |
| policy_type | one of "block", "broker", "migrate", "allow_with_controls", "monitor" | Yes |
| resource_demands | object | Yes |
| satisfied_control_ids | array of string | Yes |
| service_class_id | string (non-empty) | Yes |
| value_retention_fraction | number (≥ 0, ≤ 1) | Yes |
{
"governance_options": [
{
"dependency_option_ids": [],
"detection_coverage_scenarios": [
0.6,
0.6
],
"direct_loss_multiplier_scenarios": [
1,
1
],
"evidence_verified": true,
"exclusion_option_ids": [],
"exposure_reduction_fraction": 0.4,
"id": "coding-monitor",
"implementation_cost": 0,
"incident_probability_scenarios": [
0.1,
0.2
],
"is_current_state": true,
"operating_cost_scenarios": [
500,
500
],
"policy_type": "monitor",
"resource_demands": {
"security-review-days": 0
},
"satisfied_control_ids": [
"broker-control"
],
"service_class_id": "coding-assistant",
"value_retention_fraction": 1
},
{
"dependency_option_ids": [],
"detection_coverage_scenarios": [
0.95,
0.9
],
"direct_loss_multiplier_scenarios": [
0.2, Truncated for display — the full payload is 126 lines.
What you get back
This is the actual output of running the example above — computed by the same function the platform calls, not an illustration.
{
"assumptions": [
"Class counts, retained business value, direct loss, incident probability, detection coverage, costs and control effects are scenario-aligned prospective aggregate evidence.",
"Residual services within a provider group compound through joint survival and one common incident state, so shared value at risk is priced once rather than per class.",
"Block, broker, migrate, allow-with-controls and monitor are complete executable options with real dependencies, exclusions, budget and capacity demands."
],
"decision": "execute_governed_shadow_ai_control_portfolio",
"economics": {
"expected_loss": 9030.2538,
"expected_net_value": 2969.7462,
"expected_net_value_gain_vs_current": 79592.8444,
"implementation_cost": 5000,
"loss_conditional_value_at_risk": 35191.269,
"loss_value_at_risk": 35191.269,
"risk_adjusted_score": -14625.8883
},
"limitations": [
"Exact mode proves optimality only for the supplied finite model; beam mode is feasible and deterministic but does not prove global optimality.",
"Selection governs aggregate service classes and does not authorize person-level surveillance, discipline, security accusations or employment decisions."
],
"method": "multiple_choice_shadow_ai_governance_joint_survival_cvar_v1",
"pareto_frontier": [
{
"expected_net_value": 2969.7462,
"implementation_cost": 5000,
"loss_cvar": 35191.269,
"option_ids": [
"coding-broker"
]
},
{
"expected_net_value": -76623.0982,
"implementation_cost": 0,
"loss_cvar": 265840.809,
"option_ids": [
"coding-monitor"
]
}
],
"residual_service_exposure": {
"coding-assistant": [
1,
1.5
] Truncated for display — the full payload is 79 lines.
How it works
Forecasting & survival — Estimate when something completes or fails, with censoring and unresolved work handled honestly rather than dropped.
- 1 Validate scenario-aligned shadow counts, business value, uncontrolled loss and every executable governance option's exposure reduction, retention, detection, incident, cost and controls.
- 2 Reject portfolios breaching residual exposure, detection, controls, relations, budget or scarce security/privacy capacity.
- 3 Combine residual provider-group incidents through joint survival plus one common state, optimize expected net value minus CVaR exactly or by disclosed beam and expose the Pareto frontier.
Before you trust it
Every tool in the catalog ships with the conditions under which its answer is meaningful — and the conditions under which it should abstain instead of guessing.
Assumptions & guardrails
- Training examples precede their outcomes, censoring and unresolved work are represented, and deployment populations remain comparable to validation cohorts.
- Options are complete and prospectively executable; class counts/value/loss/effects share one coherent horizon and provider groups capture common exposure without duplicating value.
- A predictive interval or risk estimate is not a deadline promise, causal explanation, or individual-performance judgment.
- Optimization governs aggregate service classes and never authorizes person-level monitoring, disciplinary action, security accusation or employment decisions.
Minimum evidence
- service_classes: required and organization-defined
- provider_groups: required and organization-defined
- governance_options: required and organization-defined
- scenarios: required and organization-defined
- resource_capacities: required and organization-defined
- implementation_budget: required and organization-defined
How to validate it
Backtest the chosen action against simple feasible baselines on held-out scenarios, sweep costs/constraints/risk tolerance, and require constraint feasibility under adverse inputs.
Calibrating it to your org
Same for everyone
The mathematical kernel, validation rules, method version, and JSON output semantics are organization-independent; no tenant-trained coefficients or company benchmark is embedded in the function.
Specific to you
- versioned shadow-AI governance case joining capture-recapture exposure to prospectively validated intervention effects, unique retained value/shared provider loss, complete costs and executable IT/security/privacy capacity
- class/option completeness, lawful aggregate policy, effect transport, value/loss uniqueness, scenario dependence, residual/detection/control gates, dependencies/exclusions, complete costs, budget/resources, tail appetite, solver boundary and implementation authority
Calibration workflow
- 1 Define the management decision, target outcome, aggregate unit, privacy boundary, cadence, and prediction/intervention horizon for this organization.
- 2 Build a tenant-scoped historical cohort using only information available before each prediction or decision; preserve zero periods, censoring, assignment probabilities, and unresolved outcomes when the method requires them.
- 3 Estimate statistical parameters on training history, but obtain costs, utilities, risk tolerance, practical-effect thresholds, capacity, and policy constraints from accountable decision owners.
- 4 Validate on later time windows or held-out aggregate units at the deployment grain, against a simple baseline and the function-specific validation strategy.
- 5 Deploy only if the returned decision clears evidence, overlap, calibration, robustness, and guardrail checks; warning, unsupported, schema-gap, and fallback decisions are abstentions.
- 6 Monitor realized outcomes, data drift, coverage, and decision regret; recalibrate at a governed cadence or after a detected regime/definition change, never merely because a stakeholder dislikes the result.
Call it from your AI
You don't wire up 388 tools in your MCP client. The GitRevio MCP server exposes 18 tools, three of which let an agent search the catalog, read a tool's schema, and run it — so the assistant finds this one on its own.
gitrevio_capabilities_search
{ "q": "choose block broker migrate allowwithcontrols or" }
→ finds "optimize_shadow_ai_governance_portfolio"
gitrevio_capability_describe
{ "capability_id": "optimize_shadow_ai_governance_portfolio" }
→ returns the input schema and agent guidance shown on this page
gitrevio_capability_run
{ "capability_id": "optimize_shadow_ai_governance_portfolio", "arguments": { ... } }
→ returns the result shown above Works in Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, Cline, Continue.dev, Goose and Aider. See the MCP server.
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