Optimize agentic autonomy portfolio
Choose one manual, approval-required, bounded-autonomous or autonomous operating mode per action class, maximizing scenario net value under hard authorization/reversibility controls, shared-asset loss, reviewer capacity, cost, availability, dependencies and CVaR.
What it's for
Lets leadership expand AI-agent autonomy only where tested controls, reviewer capacity, economics and downside risk support it—while preserving human approval for irreversible actions.
What you give it
Inputs split into evidence read from your connected systems, calibration your team owns, and numerical controls that affect precision but never the result's meaning.
| Field | Type | Role | Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| action_classes | array of objects (7 fields) | Evidence | Yes |
| autonomy_modes | array of objects (22 fields) | Evidence | Yes |
| beam_width | integer ≥ 1, ≤ 10000 | Numerical control | Optional |
| business_assets | array of objects (3 fields) ≥ 1 item | Evidence | Yes |
| exact_enumeration_limit | integer ≥ 1, ≤ 1000000 | Your calibration | Optional |
| implementation_budget | number ≥ 0 | Your calibration | Yes |
| max_detail_rows | integer ≥ 1, ≤ 500 | Numerical control | Optional |
| maximum_cvar_total_loss | any | Your calibration | Optional |
| maximum_expected_operating_cost | any | Your calibration | Optional |
| maximum_expected_total_loss | any | Your calibration | Optional |
| maximum_mode_unavailability_probability | number ≥ 0, ≤ 1 | Your calibration | Optional |
| maximum_review_overload_probability | number ≥ 0, ≤ 1 | Your calibration | Optional |
| review_capacity_minutes | number ≥ 0 | Your calibration | Yes |
| risk_aversion | number ≥ 0 | Your calibration | Optional |
| scenarios | array of objects (3 fields) ≥ 2 items | Evidence | Yes |
| tail_probability | number ≥ 0.001, ≤ 0.5 | Your calibration | Optional |
Each autonomy_modes
record
| Field | Type | Required |
|---|---|---|
| action_class_id | string (non-empty) | Yes |
| action_volume_scenarios | array of number (≥ 2 items) | Yes |
| authorized | boolean | Yes |
| available_scenario_ids | array of string | Yes |
| compute_cost_per_action_scenarios | array of number (≥ 2 items) | Yes |
| dependency_mode_ids | array of string | Yes |
| direct_loss_per_failure_scenarios | array of number (≥ 2 items) | Yes |
| evidence_verified | boolean | Yes |
| exclusion_mode_ids | array of string | Yes |
| gross_value_per_success_scenarios | array of number (≥ 2 items) | Yes |
| human_approval_required | boolean | Yes |
| id | string (non-empty) | Yes |
| is_current_state | boolean | Yes |
| kill_switch_tested | boolean | Yes |
| latency_cost_per_action_scenarios | array of number (≥ 2 items) | Yes |
| mode | one of "manual", "approval_required", "bounded_autonomous", "autonomous" | Yes |
| review_minutes_per_action_scenarios | array of number (≥ 2 items) | Yes |
| rollback_supported | boolean | Yes |
| sandboxed | boolean | Yes |
| success_probability_scenarios | array of number (≥ 2 items) | Yes |
| terminal_loss_probability_scenarios | array of number (≥ 2 items) | Yes |
| upfront_cost | number (≥ 0) | Yes |
{
"action_classes": [
{
"asset_id": "payments",
"asset_loss_fraction_if_failure": 0.5,
"critical": false,
"evidence_verified": true,
"external_side_effects": true,
"id": "deploy",
"irreversible": false
},
{
"asset_id": "payments",
"asset_loss_fraction_if_failure": 0.8,
"critical": true,
"evidence_verified": true,
"external_side_effects": true,
"id": "migration",
"irreversible": true
}
],
"autonomy_modes": [
{
"action_class_id": "deploy",
"action_volume_scenarios": [
10,
12
],
"authorized": true,
"available_scenario_ids": [
"base",
"stress"
],
"compute_cost_per_action_scenarios": [
0.1,
0.1
],
"dependency_mode_ids": [],
"direct_loss_per_failure_scenarios": [
5,
8
],
"evidence_verified": true,
"exclusion_mode_ids": [], Truncated for display — the full payload is 249 lines.
What you get back
This is the actual output of running the example above — computed by the same function the platform calls, not an illustration.
{
"action_class_diagnostics": [
{
"action_class_id": "deploy",
"asset_id": "payments",
"critical": false,
"external_side_effects": true,
"irreversible": false,
"selected_mode": "bounded_autonomous",
"selected_mode_id": "deploy-bounded"
},
{
"action_class_id": "migration",
"asset_id": "payments",
"critical": true,
"external_side_effects": true,
"irreversible": true,
"selected_mode": "approval_required",
"selected_mode_id": "migration-approval"
}
],
"assumptions": [
"Each action class selects exactly one executable mode on common scenarios. Volumes, success, terminal loss, value, direct loss, compute, latency and review definitions share one horizon and are prospectively evidenced.",
"Several action classes can reach one business asset; per-action failure unions within a mode and loss unions across modes, so governed asset value is not duplicated. Direct response loss, operating cost and business loss remain non-overlapping.",
"Operational safety is a hard feasibility gate, not a price: authorization is mandatory, irreversible actions retain human approval, and external autonomous actions require sandbox, tested kill switch and rollback or approval.",
"Exactness covers only the supplied finite scenario model; beam output is heuristic. No mode selection grants privileges, bypasses security/legal/fiduciary approval, evaluates named people or authorizes an external side effect or production change."
],
"autonomy_pareto_frontier": [
{
"conditional_value_at_risk": 41.173,
"expected_net_value": 111.3629,
"implementation_spend": 4,
"mode_ids": [
"deploy-bounded",
"migration-approval"
],
"review_overload_probability": 0
}
],
"baseline_current_state": {
"conditional_value_at_risk": 37.173,
"expected_net_value": 46.1329,
"expected_total_loss": 23.0971,
"feasible": false, Truncated for display — the full payload is 115 lines.
How it works
Constrained optimization — Pick the best feasible option under real limits — budget, headcount, dependencies, capacity — rather than ranking a list and hoping it fits.
- 1 Freeze unique assets, aggregate action classes and common scenarios; require one current and several prospectively evidenced executable modes with complete value, failure, direct-loss, cost, review, availability and relation vectors.
- 2 Treat authorization and irreversible-action approval as hard constraints; require sandbox, tested kill switch and rollback or approval for external autonomous modes before pricing their economics.
- 3 Enumerate the multiple-choice policy exactly when tractable or disclose value-ordered beam search, union repeated asset exposure, and return the expected-net-value/CVaR/implementation-spend Pareto frontier.
Before you trust it
Every tool in the catalog ships with the conditions under which its answer is meaningful — and the conditions under which it should abstain instead of guessing.
Assumptions & guardrails
- Objectives use commensurable locally governed value units, constraints reflect real feasibility, and uncertainty covers plausible adverse inputs.
- Mode effects are prospective and share one scenario horizon; action volumes and loss probabilities are calibrated at the deployment grain; costs and asset/direct losses are non-overlapping; dependencies and availability reflect executable reality.
- The recommendation is optimal only for its stated objective, feasible set, evidence, and solver guarantee; it is not a universal management optimum.
- Exactness covers only the submitted finite model and beam output is heuristic; no selection grants privileges, bypasses security/legal/fiduciary approval, evaluates named people or authorizes an external side effect or production change.
Minimum evidence
- business_assets: at least 1 rows/items
- action_classes: required and organization-defined
- scenarios: at least 2 rows/items
- autonomy_modes: required and organization-defined
- implementation_budget: required and organization-defined
- review_capacity_minutes: required and organization-defined
How to validate it
Backtest the chosen action against simple feasible baselines on held-out scenarios, sweep costs/constraints/risk tolerance, and require constraint feasibility under adverse inputs.
Calibrating it to your org
Same for everyone
The mathematical kernel, validation rules, method version, and JSON output semantics are organization-independent; no tenant-trained coefficients or company benchmark is embedded in the function.
Specific to you
- versioned candidate-mode projection joined to one action/asset/scenario perimeter, preserving one mode per action class, effective authorization, tested recovery controls, shared asset identity, implementation relations and current-state comparator
- mode executability and causal evidence, authorization, irreversible approval, sandbox/rollback/kill-switch evidence, action volume and scenario dependence, unique value and full cost perimeter, reviewer capacity, availability, dependencies/exclusions, expected/CVaR gates, solver boundary and security/legal/risk/finance approval
Calibration workflow
- 1 Define the management decision, target outcome, aggregate unit, privacy boundary, cadence, and prediction/intervention horizon for this organization.
- 2 Build a tenant-scoped historical cohort using only information available before each prediction or decision; preserve zero periods, censoring, assignment probabilities, and unresolved outcomes when the method requires them.
- 3 Estimate statistical parameters on training history, but obtain costs, utilities, risk tolerance, practical-effect thresholds, capacity, and policy constraints from accountable decision owners.
- 4 Validate on later time windows or held-out aggregate units at the deployment grain, against a simple baseline and the function-specific validation strategy.
- 5 Deploy only if the returned decision clears evidence, overlap, calibration, robustness, and guardrail checks; warning, unsupported, schema-gap, and fallback decisions are abstentions.
- 6 Monitor realized outcomes, data drift, coverage, and decision regret; recalibrate at a governed cadence or after a detected regime/definition change, never merely because a stakeholder dislikes the result.
Call it from your AI
You don't wire up 388 tools in your MCP client. The GitRevio MCP server exposes 18 tools, three of which let an agent search the catalog, read a tool's schema, and run it — so the assistant finds this one on its own.
gitrevio_capabilities_search
{ "q": "choose one manual approvalrequired boundedautonomous or" }
→ finds "optimize_agentic_autonomy_portfolio"
gitrevio_capability_describe
{ "capability_id": "optimize_agentic_autonomy_portfolio" }
→ returns the input schema and agent guidance shown on this page
gitrevio_capability_run
{ "capability_id": "optimize_agentic_autonomy_portfolio", "arguments": { ... } }
→ returns the result shown above Works in Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, Cline, Continue.dev, Goose and Aider. See the MCP server.
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