Audit technology risk appetite integrity

Audit whether board technology-risk appetite is executable rather than rhetorical: verify approval and point-in-time lineage, reconcile the root to finance limits, cover every aggregate risk unit exactly once, validate an acyclic owner/action limit tree, cap unsupported diversification credit and surface every breach with an executable escalation.

What it's for

Lets boards, CTOs and investors distinguish a real technology-risk appetite—with reconciled limits, owners, scenarios and actions—from a slide containing unexecutable risk language.

What you give it

Inputs split into evidence read from your connected systems, calibration your team owns, and numerical controls that affect precision but never the result's meaning.

Field Type Role Required
appetite object Evidence Yes
detail_limit integer ≥ 1, ≤ 500 Your calibration Optional
evidence_cutoff integer ≥ 0 Your calibration Yes
expected_unit_ids array of string Evidence Yes
maximum_diversification_credit_fraction number ≥ 0, ≤ 1 Your calibration Optional
maximum_unverified_fraction number ≥ 0, ≤ 1 Your calibration Optional
required_approval_roles array of string Evidence Yes
risk_limits array of objects (12 fields) Evidence Yes
scenarios array of objects (2 fields) Evidence Yes

Each appetite record

Field Type Required
approved_at integer (≥ 0) Yes
approved_by_roles array of string Yes
confidence_level number (≥ 0.5, ≤ 0.999) Yes
currency string (non-empty) Yes
cvar_loss_limit number (≥ 0) Yes
economic_capital_limit number (≥ 0) Yes
effective_at integer (≥ 0) Yes
evidence_verified boolean Yes
expected_loss_limit number (≥ 0) Yes
horizon_periods integer (≥ 1, ≤ 1000) Yes
id string (non-empty) Yes
minimum_raroc number (≥ -10, ≤ 100) Yes
version string (non-empty) Yes
Example input
{
  "appetite": {
    "approved_at": 90,
    "approved_by_roles": [
      "board",
      "cfo",
      "cro"
    ],
    "confidence_level": 0.95,
    "currency": "EUR",
    "cvar_loss_limit": 180,
    "economic_capital_limit": 150,
    "effective_at": 100,
    "evidence_verified": true,
    "expected_loss_limit": 40,
    "horizon_periods": 4,
    "id": "board-risk-2027",
    "minimum_raroc": 0.1,
    "version": "v1"
  },
  "evidence_cutoff": 100,
  "expected_unit_ids": [
    "platform",
    "data"
  ],
  "required_approval_roles": [
    "board",
    "cfo",
    "cro"
  ],
  "risk_limits": [
    {
      "breach_action_id": "board-escalation",
      "cvar_loss_limit": 180,
      "economic_capital_limit": 150,
      "evidence_verified": true,
      "expected_loss_limit": 40,
      "id": "root",
      "node_type": "root",
      "observed_at": 100,
      "owner_role": "cro",
      "parent_limit_id": null,
      "unit_id": null
    },

Truncated for display — the full payload is 96 lines.

What you get back

This is the actual output of running the example above — computed by the same function the platform calls, not an illustration.

Example output
{
  "appetite_limits": {
    "cvar_loss": 180,
    "economic_capital": 150,
    "expected_loss": 40
  },
  "breaches": [],
  "configuration": {
    "appetite_id": "board-risk-2027",
    "confidence_level": 0.95,
    "currency": "EUR",
    "horizon_periods": 4,
    "maximum_diversification_credit_fraction": 0.5,
    "minimum_raroc": 0.1,
    "version": "v1"
  },
  "decision": "publish",
  "detail_truncated": false,
  "failed_gates": [],
  "finding": "risk_appetite_executable_and_within_limits",
  "findings": [],
  "governance": [
    "The board and finance own appetite, currency, horizon and capital capacity; risk owners own scenarios, limits and escalation actions.",
    "Allocated child limits may exceed a parent only within the explicit diversification-credit ceiling; coherent scenarios must substantiate the diversification.",
    "A breach is an aggregate financial-control event, not evidence about a person, team, intent or employment decision."
  ],
  "hierarchy_diversification": [
    {
      "diversification_credit_fraction": 0,
      "limit_id": "root",
      "metric": "expected_loss"
    },
    {
      "diversification_credit_fraction": 0,
      "limit_id": "root",
      "metric": "cvar_loss"
    },
    {
      "diversification_credit_fraction": 0,
      "limit_id": "root",
      "metric": "economic_capital"
    }
  ],
  "method": "board_appetite_scenario_limit_tree_integrity_v1",

Truncated for display — the full payload is 53 lines.

How it works

Statistical audit & measurement — Check whether a number is fit to decide on: coverage, timing, reconciliation, and the gaps a dashboard hides.

  1. 1 Freeze the appetite version, approval roles and times, evidence cutoff, currency, horizon, confidence, expected-loss/CVaR/economic-capital limits and minimum RAROC before reading current exposures.
  2. 2 Reconstruct the complete root/group/unit limit tree, reject cycles, orphans, duplicate or missing unit coverage, future/unverified evidence, incoherent loss limits and any root value that does not equal the approved appetite.
  3. 3 Aggregate each node from zero-inclusive coherent unit-loss scenarios, compute expected loss/CVaR/economic capital, quantify implied parent-child diversification credit and require an executable action for every current breach.

Before you trust it

Every tool in the catalog ships with the conditions under which its answer is meaningful — and the conditions under which it should abstain instead of guessing.

Assumptions & guardrails

  • Metric definitions, weights, aggregate grain, sampling, missingness, dependence, and comparison windows correspond to the management claim being audited.
  • The board-approved appetite is current and immutable; finance definitions, scenario order, currency and horizon are common; units are mutually exclusive aggregates; every material loss is represented exactly once; owner roles and escalation actions are executable.
  • Association, instability, or measurement quality is not a causal effect and must not be converted directly into an individual employment decision.
  • Passing means the risk-control system is internally executable, not that losses are impossible or that limits are optimal. A breach is an aggregate financial-control event and never evidence about a person, team, intent or employment decision.

Minimum evidence

  • appetite: required and organization-defined
  • risk_limits: required and organization-defined
  • scenarios: required and organization-defined
  • expected_unit_ids: required and organization-defined
  • required_approval_roles: required and organization-defined
  • evidence_cutoff: required and organization-defined

How to validate it

Validate on future periods or held-out aggregate units, compare with a simple baseline, and require stability across plausible metric definitions and decision thresholds.

Calibrating it to your org

Same for everyone

The mathematical kernel, validation rules, method version, and JSON output semantics are organization-independent; no tenant-trained coefficients or company benchmark is embedded in the function.

Specific to you

  • point-in-time complete aggregate technology-unit perimeter joined to the active appetite and limit version; acyclic parent/child projection; node-level scenario aggregation, expected loss, exact CVaR, economic capital, current breaches and implied diversification credit
  • board approval and effective-time policy, finance currency/horizon/loss definitions, scenario confidence and completeness, risk-unit taxonomy, required owners and escalation actions, evidence cutoff, verification tolerance and maximum unsupported diversification credit

Calibration workflow

  1. 1 Define the management decision, target outcome, aggregate unit, privacy boundary, cadence, and prediction/intervention horizon for this organization.
  2. 2 Build a tenant-scoped historical cohort using only information available before each prediction or decision; preserve zero periods, censoring, assignment probabilities, and unresolved outcomes when the method requires them.
  3. 3 Estimate statistical parameters on training history, but obtain costs, utilities, risk tolerance, practical-effect thresholds, capacity, and policy constraints from accountable decision owners.
  4. 4 Validate on later time windows or held-out aggregate units at the deployment grain, against a simple baseline and the function-specific validation strategy.
  5. 5 Deploy only if the returned decision clears evidence, overlap, calibration, robustness, and guardrail checks; warning, unsupported, schema-gap, and fallback decisions are abstentions.
  6. 6 Monitor realized outcomes, data drift, coverage, and decision regret; recalibrate at a governed cadence or after a detected regime/definition change, never merely because a stakeholder dislikes the result.

Call it from your AI

You don't wire up 388 tools in your MCP client. The GitRevio MCP server exposes 18 tools, three of which let an agent search the catalog, read a tool's schema, and run it — so the assistant finds this one on its own.

gitrevio_capabilities_search
  { "q": "audit whether board technologyrisk appetite is" }
  → finds "audit_technology_risk_appetite_integrity"

gitrevio_capability_describe
  { "capability_id": "audit_technology_risk_appetite_integrity" }
  → returns the input schema and agent guidance shown on this page

gitrevio_capability_run
  { "capability_id": "audit_technology_risk_appetite_integrity", "arguments": { ... } }
  → returns the result shown above

Works in Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, Cline, Continue.dev, Goose and Aider. See the MCP server.

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