Audit operational alert decision integrity
Audit every point-in-time operational alert evaluation by recomputing fire/suppress decisions and verifying effective policy, cooldown, evidence freshness, context, controls, severity routing, acknowledgement, action and mature outcome lineage.
What it's for
Makes Gitrevio's context-cause-action, cooldown, severity routing and acknowledgement claims independently auditable instead of assuming a delivered notification was correct or useful.
What you give it
Inputs split into evidence read from your connected systems, calibration your team owns, and numerical controls that affect precision but never the result's meaning.
| Field | Type | Role | Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| alert_evaluations | array of objects (20 fields) | Evidence | Yes |
| alert_events | array of objects (8 fields) ≥ 0 items | Evidence | Yes |
| alert_outcomes | array of objects (6 fields) ≥ 0 items | Evidence | Yes |
| alert_policies | array of objects (17 fields) | Evidence | Yes |
| as_of_ms | number ≥ 0 | Your calibration | Yes |
| max_detail_rows | integer ≥ 1, ≤ 500 | Numerical control | Optional |
| minimum_verified_evaluation_fraction | number ≥ 0, ≤ 1 | Your calibration | Optional |
Each alert_evaluations
record
| Field | Type | Required |
|---|---|---|
| aggregate_unit_id | string (non-empty) | Yes |
| alert_class_id | string (non-empty) | Yes |
| alert_fired | boolean | Yes |
| channel_id | string (non-empty) | Yes |
| condition_episode_id | string (non-empty) | Yes |
| eligible | boolean | Yes |
| evaluated_at_ms | number (≥ 0) | Yes |
| evidence_snapshot_hash | string (non-empty) | Yes |
| evidence_verified | boolean | Yes |
| id | string (non-empty) | Yes |
| observed_data_age_ms | number (≥ 0) | Yes |
| outcome_due_at_ms | number (≥ 0) | Yes |
| policy_id | string (non-empty) | Yes |
| risk_score | number (≥ 0, ≤ 1) | Yes |
| routed_recipient_role_ids | array of string | Yes |
| satisfied_context_ids | array of string | Yes |
| satisfied_control_ids | array of string | Yes |
| severity_id | string (non-empty) | Yes |
| source_system_id | string (non-empty) | Yes |
| suppression_reason_id | string,null | Yes |
{
"alert_evaluations": [
{
"aggregate_unit_id": "team-a",
"alert_class_id": "delivery-risk",
"alert_fired": true,
"channel_id": "slack",
"condition_episode_id": "episode-1",
"eligible": true,
"evaluated_at_ms": 1000,
"evidence_snapshot_hash": "snapshot-1",
"evidence_verified": true,
"id": "evaluation-1",
"observed_data_age_ms": 100,
"outcome_due_at_ms": 1500,
"policy_id": "delivery-v1",
"risk_score": 0.9,
"routed_recipient_role_ids": [
"team-lead"
],
"satisfied_context_ids": [
"trajectory",
"blockers"
],
"satisfied_control_ids": [
"tenant-scope"
],
"severity_id": "p1",
"source_system_id": "alert-engine",
"suppression_reason_id": null
}
],
"alert_events": [
{
"acknowledged_at_ms": 1100,
"action_id": "redistribute-review",
"action_started_at_ms": 1200,
"evaluation_id": "evaluation-1",
"evidence_verified": true,
"fired_at_ms": 1010,
"id": "alert-1",
"resolved_at_ms": 1400
}
], Truncated for display — the full payload is 93 lines.
What you get back
This is the actual output of running the example above — computed by the same function the platform calls, not an illustration.
{
"configuration": {
"as_of_ms": 2000,
"minimum_verified_evaluation_fraction": 0.95
},
"decision": "pass",
"evaluation_diagnostics": [
{
"alert_class_id": "delivery-risk",
"evaluation_id": "evaluation-1",
"expected_fired": true,
"failed_gates": [],
"passed": true,
"policy_id": "delivery-v1",
"recorded_fired": true
}
],
"failed_gates": {
"evaluation_failure_counts": {},
"orphan_alert_event_ids": [],
"orphan_outcome_ids": []
},
"guardrails": [
"This function audits submitted alert-decision evidence; it does not establish causality, infer intent, or prove every material condition was observable.",
"Named-person alerts and employment/security actions require separate lawful purpose, proportionality, human review, correction rights and access controls.",
"Passing never authorizes a notification, escalation, investigation, access change, employment action or production intervention."
],
"method": "point_in_time_operational_alert_decision_evidence_audit_v1",
"summary": {
"alert_event_count": 1,
"evaluation_count": 1,
"fired_evaluation_count": 1,
"mature_outcome_count": 1,
"verified_evaluation_count": 1,
"verified_evaluation_fraction": 1
}
} How it works
Constrained optimization — Pick the best feasible option under real limits — budget, headcount, dependencies, capacity — rather than ranking a list and hoping it fits.
- 1 Freeze independently reviewed alert-policy versions, eligibility, score thresholds, context/control/routing requirements, permitted suppressions, cooldown, freshness and response clocks at the as-of cutoff.
- 2 Recompute each evaluation's expected fire/suppress decision, validate a cooldown only against an earlier alert in the same policy/unit/condition episode, and reconcile fired decisions one-to-one to immutable alert events.
- 3 Verify recipient role, severity/channel, timely acknowledgement, required action and due mature outcome evidence; expose orphan events/outcomes and return repair gates rather than an actionability claim.
Before you trust it
Every tool in the catalog ships with the conditions under which its answer is meaningful — and the conditions under which it should abstain instead of guessing.
Assumptions & guardrails
- Objectives use commensurable locally governed value units, constraints reflect real feasibility, and uncertainty covers plausible adverse inputs.
- The eligible evaluation ledger includes non-fires and suppressed decisions, policy/condition episodes are stable, snapshots precede decisions, and alert/action/outcome records are complete and immutable.
- The recommendation is optimal only for its stated objective, feasible set, evidence, and solver guarantee; it is not a universal management optimum.
- Passing establishes submitted alert-decision evidence integrity, not causal action value, complete observability, intent, employment/security grounds or authority to notify or intervene.
Minimum evidence
- alert_policies: required and organization-defined
- alert_evaluations: required and organization-defined
- alert_events: at least 0 rows/items
- alert_outcomes: at least 0 rows/items
- as_of_ms: required and organization-defined
How to validate it
Backtest the chosen action against simple feasible baselines on held-out scenarios, sweep costs/constraints/risk tolerance, and require constraint feasibility under adverse inputs.
Calibrating it to your org
Same for everyone
The mathematical kernel, validation rules, method version, and JSON output semantics are organization-independent; no tenant-trained coefficients or company benchmark is embedded in the function.
Specific to you
- tenant-scoped point-in-time evaluation chain joined to exactly one effective policy, prior same-episode cooldown evidence, one alert event per fire and one verified outcome per due evaluation without future leakage
- alert class and aggregate unit, condition episode, eligibility, score semantics/threshold, required context/controls/roles, allowed severity/channel/suppression, cooldown, freshness, response clocks, action requirement, outcome maturity and coverage
Calibration workflow
- 1 Define the management decision, target outcome, aggregate unit, privacy boundary, cadence, and prediction/intervention horizon for this organization.
- 2 Build a tenant-scoped historical cohort using only information available before each prediction or decision; preserve zero periods, censoring, assignment probabilities, and unresolved outcomes when the method requires them.
- 3 Estimate statistical parameters on training history, but obtain costs, utilities, risk tolerance, practical-effect thresholds, capacity, and policy constraints from accountable decision owners.
- 4 Validate on later time windows or held-out aggregate units at the deployment grain, against a simple baseline and the function-specific validation strategy.
- 5 Deploy only if the returned decision clears evidence, overlap, calibration, robustness, and guardrail checks; warning, unsupported, schema-gap, and fallback decisions are abstentions.
- 6 Monitor realized outcomes, data drift, coverage, and decision regret; recalibrate at a governed cadence or after a detected regime/definition change, never merely because a stakeholder dislikes the result.
Call it from your AI
You don't wire up 388 tools in your MCP client. The GitRevio MCP server exposes 18 tools, three of which let an agent search the catalog, read a tool's schema, and run it — so the assistant finds this one on its own.
gitrevio_capabilities_search
{ "q": "audit every pointintime operational alert evaluation" }
→ finds "audit_operational_alert_decision_integrity"
gitrevio_capability_describe
{ "capability_id": "audit_operational_alert_decision_integrity" }
→ returns the input schema and agent guidance shown on this page
gitrevio_capability_run
{ "capability_id": "audit_operational_alert_decision_integrity", "arguments": { ... } }
→ returns the result shown above Works in Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, Cline, Continue.dev, Goose and Aider. See the MCP server.
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