Audit AI privacy budget integrity
Recompute each aggregate AI privacy account from its immutable release ledger using additive Rényi differential-privacy composition and target-delta conversion, while auditing order grids, sequence, hashes, accounting periods, purpose, review approval, evidence and claimed-versus-actual budget spend.
What it's for
Replaces privacy checkboxes with an auditable privacy-spend ledger: leadership can see exactly which AI releases consumed each population's formal budget and whether the claimed bound actually composes.
What you give it
Inputs split into evidence read from your connected systems, calibration your team owns, and numerical controls that affect precision but never the result's meaning.
| Field | Type | Role | Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| epsilon_reconciliation_tolerance | number ≥ 0 | Your calibration | Optional |
| max_detail_rows | integer ≥ 1, ≤ 500 | Numerical control | Optional |
| minimum_evidence_coverage | number ≥ 0, ≤ 1 | Your calibration | Optional |
| privacy_accounts | array of objects (10 fields) | Evidence | Yes |
| privacy_releases | array of objects (12 fields) | Evidence | Yes |
Each privacy_releases
record
| Field | Type | Required |
|---|---|---|
| evidence_verified | boolean | Yes |
| id | string (non-empty) | Yes |
| mechanism_type | one of "gaussian", "laplace", "randomized_response", "subsampled_gaussian", "custom_verified" | Yes |
| privacy_account_id | string (non-empty) | Yes |
| privacy_review_approved | boolean | Yes |
| purpose_id | string (non-empty) | Yes |
| rdp_epsilon_by_order | array of number (≥ 1 item) | Yes |
| release_hash | string (non-empty) | Yes |
| release_sequence | integer (≥ 1) | Yes |
| released_at_ms | number (≥ 0) | Yes |
| sampling_probability | number (≥ 0, ≤ 1) | Yes |
| subject_count | integer (≥ 1) | Yes |
{
"privacy_accounts": [
{
"claimed_composed_epsilon": 1.5675283643313485,
"evidence_verified": true,
"id": "customer-analytics-account",
"maximum_epsilon": 2,
"period_ended_at_ms": 10000,
"period_started_at_ms": 0,
"permitted_purpose_ids": [
"support-analytics"
],
"privacy_population_id": "eu-customers",
"rdp_orders": [
2,
4,
8,
16
],
"target_delta": 0.00001
}
],
"privacy_releases": [
{
"evidence_verified": true,
"id": "support-statistics-release-1",
"mechanism_type": "subsampled_gaussian",
"privacy_account_id": "customer-analytics-account",
"privacy_review_approved": true,
"purpose_id": "support-analytics",
"rdp_epsilon_by_order": [
0.1,
0.2,
0.4,
0.8
],
"release_hash": "sha256:support-statistics-release-1",
"release_sequence": 1,
"released_at_ms": 1000,
"sampling_probability": 0.1,
"subject_count": 10000
}
]
} What you get back
This is the actual output of running the example above — computed by the same function the platform calls, not an illustration.
{
"account_diagnostics": [
{
"best_rdp_order": 16,
"claimed_epsilon": 1.5675,
"composed_epsilon": 1.5675,
"epsilon_candidates_by_order": [
11.6129,
4.0376,
2.0447,
1.5675
],
"epsilon_reconciliation_gap": 0,
"failed_gates": [],
"maximum_epsilon": 2,
"privacy_account_id": "customer-analytics-account",
"privacy_population_id": "eu-customers",
"rdp_epsilon_by_order": [
0.1,
0.2,
0.4,
0.8
],
"release_count": 1,
"target_delta": 0
}
],
"assumptions": [
"Every RDP vector already includes the approved mechanism's sampling-amplification analysis and uses the exact common order grid declared by its privacy account.",
"A privacy account represents one governed neighboring-population relation; releases that can touch the same person are never split across accounts to evade composition.",
"RDP composes additively and converts to the represented approximate-DP epsilon at the target delta; the accountant does not infer mechanism parameters from labels."
],
"counts": {
"budget_breaches": 0,
"invalid_releases": 0,
"privacy_accounts": 1,
"privacy_releases": 1,
"reconciled_accounts": 1
},
"decision": "privacy_budget_ledger_verified",
"evidence": {
"gate_pass": true,
"minimum_required_fraction": 0.95,
"verified_fraction": 1 Truncated for display — the full payload is 54 lines.
How it works
Statistical audit & measurement — Check whether a number is fit to decide on: coverage, timing, reconciliation, and the gaps a dashboard hides.
- 1 Validate each privacy account's neighboring population, strictly increasing RDP order grid, target delta, budget, purpose perimeter and accounting period.
- 2 Join every immutable private release to one account and audit consecutive sequence, unique hash, time, purpose, mechanism, review and aligned precomputed RDP vector.
- 3 Sum RDP at every order, convert to the tightest represented approximate-DP epsilon, reconcile the claim and freeze releases when evidence or budget gates fail.
Before you trust it
Every tool in the catalog ships with the conditions under which its answer is meaningful — and the conditions under which it should abstain instead of guessing.
Assumptions & guardrails
- Metric definitions, weights, aggregate grain, sampling, missingness, dependence, and comparison windows correspond to the management claim being audited.
- RDP vectors come from an approved accountant using the exact implemented mechanism, clipping, sampling and neighboring relation; accounts are not split to evade composition.
- Association, instability, or measurement quality is not a causal effect and must not be converted directly into an individual employment decision.
- Epsilon is a formal privacy bound, not breach probability, expected harm, legal safe harbor, implementation proof or a person/team score.
Minimum evidence
- privacy_accounts: required and organization-defined
- privacy_releases: required and organization-defined
How to validate it
Validate on future periods or held-out aggregate units, compare with a simple baseline, and require stability across plausible metric definitions and decision thresholds.
Calibrating it to your org
Same for everyone
The mathematical kernel, validation rules, method version, and JSON output semantics are organization-independent; no tenant-trained coefficients or company benchmark is embedded in the function.
Specific to you
- tenant-scoped append-only formal privacy ledger joining every AI release to one unsplittable neighboring-population account and the exact approved accountant artifact used before release
- neighboring relation, account perimeter, order grid, mechanism/clipping/sampling semantics, target delta, epsilon budget, purpose, review/evidence authority, reconciliation tolerance and release-freeze authority
Calibration workflow
- 1 Define the management decision, target outcome, aggregate unit, privacy boundary, cadence, and prediction/intervention horizon for this organization.
- 2 Build a tenant-scoped historical cohort using only information available before each prediction or decision; preserve zero periods, censoring, assignment probabilities, and unresolved outcomes when the method requires them.
- 3 Estimate statistical parameters on training history, but obtain costs, utilities, risk tolerance, practical-effect thresholds, capacity, and policy constraints from accountable decision owners.
- 4 Validate on later time windows or held-out aggregate units at the deployment grain, against a simple baseline and the function-specific validation strategy.
- 5 Deploy only if the returned decision clears evidence, overlap, calibration, robustness, and guardrail checks; warning, unsupported, schema-gap, and fallback decisions are abstentions.
- 6 Monitor realized outcomes, data drift, coverage, and decision regret; recalibrate at a governed cadence or after a detected regime/definition change, never merely because a stakeholder dislikes the result.
Call it from your AI
You don't wire up 388 tools in your MCP client. The GitRevio MCP server exposes 18 tools, three of which let an agent search the catalog, read a tool's schema, and run it — so the assistant finds this one on its own.
gitrevio_capabilities_search
{ "q": "recompute each aggregate ai privacy account" }
→ finds "audit_ai_privacy_budget_integrity"
gitrevio_capability_describe
{ "capability_id": "audit_ai_privacy_budget_integrity" }
→ returns the input schema and agent guidance shown on this page
gitrevio_capability_run
{ "capability_id": "audit_ai_privacy_budget_integrity", "arguments": { ... } }
→ returns the result shown above Works in Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, Cline, Continue.dev, Goose and Aider. See the MCP server.
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